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Removal of Future Interest Encumbrances-
Sale of the Fee Simple Estate
Candler S. Rogers*
The removal of future interest encumbrances on realty may in
proper cases relieve hardship of private parties and be of benefit to
the community by rendering the land marketable and productive. The
author here examines the scope of equity jurisdiction in these cases
and the applicable statutes. The author concludes with proposals
to improve the statutory treatment of the problem and suggests that
equity already has the power to provide the relief contained in his
statutory proposals.
The desire to tie up property, and especially to preserve it within
families, is the key force underlying a substantial body of land law.
It is the key force underlying the creation of all future interests.' The
estate planners, representing personal and family interests in wealth,
seek effective methods of securely tying up that wealth. They wish
to prevent its alienation and control its use as far into the future as
they can. They therefore vigorously oppose any attempts to remove
their encumbrances or to limit their creation of new ones. There is
also a very deeply engrained parallel desire that every owner of land
should be free to use and distribute it as he pleases.2 This freedom
includes, in the thinking of most Americans, the right to restrict as
well as to grant the utilization and alienability of their lands. Any
attempts to limit this freedom are met with cries of anguished passion
as being attempts to destroy one of the most precious of human values
in American culture.
On the other hand, many of those same anguished criers are likely
to be the strongest proponents of removal of the barriers to new uses
and free alienation when they discover their lands encumbered, un-
productive, and unmarketable because of entangling restrictions
placed thereon by their forebearers. As they become land developers
or conveyancers their interests are in commerce and the marketable
title to their lands. 3 They seek methods to facilitate the transfer of
encumbered property free of its restraints.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City.
1. 1 Sm s & SNrrr, FUTrE. INTRES s § 3 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
Snsts & Smrr].
2. Barkdull, Foreword to Snmus, PUBLIC PoLicY AND =H DEAD HAND at xii (1955).
3. For discussion of obstacles to such free use and alienation other than those
resulting from future interests, and for suggested remedies to such obstacles, see
Snmss & TAYLOR, IMwPoRmmNT oF CONVEYANCLNr BY LEGISLATION (1960); Cook,
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Other interests in society may join to support this latter group. The
effect of permitting land to be tied up is usually to injure the com-
munity. It suffers from the reduction in marketable land which is
available for the development of new enterprises. The tax base of
the community is lowered because the value of the land is reduced.
Therefore higher taxes must be paid by the owners of unrestricted
land. The neighborhood generally suffers aesthetically and otherwise
when the property is allowed to deteriorate, as it often does under
restrictions rendering it unmarketable. And to make all these matters
worse, land is the most basic resource of the community. Its supply
is limited. If it is tied up, there may be no other available supply
of desirable land in a neighborhood. 4 There is, therefore, a pressure
exerted by conveyancers, land developers, the community, and society
to limit the tying up of property with the resulting removal of it from
commerce and from its highest and best use.5
The concern of a substantial body of future interest law is the
achieving of a proper balance between these conflicting forces, and
many statutes and decisions in the field reduce under close scrutiny to
curtailing extremes of either viewpoint. Many illustrations of these
checks and counter-checks are found in the history of land law. The
statute De Donis Conditionalibus6 permitted creation of the fee tail
estate in such form that the entail could not be broken. But two cen-
turies later, in Taltarum's Case,7 the fictitious common recovery pro-
vided the means of barring both the tenant in tail and the reversioner
or remainderman. The Statute of Uses,8 with its subsequent inter-
pretation in such cases as Pells v. Brown,9 provided another scheme
for restricting land by the method of employing certain indestructible
future interests. To offset the detrimental effect of this on land use
American Land Law Reform: Legal Co-Ownership, Dower, and Curtesy, 1960 DuXn
L.J. 486. For a discussion of additional future interest considerations beyond the
scope of this article, see Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1255
(1960). The English Property law legislation of 1925 provides an interesting com-
parison with property law reforms in the United States, especially in the area with
which this article deals. For discussions of that act, see MEGAMRY & WADE, THE LAW
OF REAL PRoPERTrY (1959); Bordwell, English Property Reform and its American
Aspects, 37 Y ALE L.J. 1, 179 (1927); Schnebly, "Legal" and "Equitable" Interests in
Land Under the English Legislation of 1925, 40 H v. L. Rv. 248 (1926).
4. See, for general discussion and elaboration of this point, LEAcH & LOGAN, CASES
ON FuTuRE INTEREsTs AND EsTAT PLANNING 75 n.45 (1961); Chaffin, Reverters,
Rights of Entry, and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion and the Tying Up of
Land, 31 FoBDHAm L. Rv. 303 (1962); Simes, Elimination of Stale Restrictions on
the Use of Land, ABA SECrioN ON REAL PROPERTY, PRtoBATE AND TRUST LAW 4 (1954).
5. SIMS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FururE INTERESTs 2 (2d ed. 1951).
6. 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. 1.
7. 1472, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, c. 19.
8. 1536, 27 Henry VII, c. 10.
9. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
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and commerce, the rule against perpetuities was developed. 10
The problems are still unsolved, and the struggle between the view-
points continues. In 1928, Professor Schnebly" first analyzed and
discussed a new and growing development in that struggle. He
pointed out that through means of partition statutes, as well as in-
dependently thereof, there had evolved a substantial body of law
which permitted a judicial sale in fee simple of land encumbered by
a future interest under certain circumstances. This body of law had
developed in relative obscurity to provide the major method of
making possible the termination of future interests in land.
It is the purpose of this article to review that body of law as it
applies to legal estates, to trace its course since then, and to elaborate
on its development as the newer decisions permit.12
10. SiCxEs, CASES oN FUrTuR INTRaEsTS 14 (2d ed. 1951).
11. Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other Interests
by Judicial Process, 42 HARy. L. REV. 30 (1928). See the tribute paid Professor
Schnebly for this work in Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50 HARv. L. REv.
749, 760 (1937).
12. Although considered to a limited extent, and although some of the cases
cited will involve trusts where that element appears immaterial to the principle for
which they are cited, land held in trust will not be given substantial direct treatment
here because very few difficult problems in this area appear. There are several
reasons for this. First, the power to sell, lease, or mortgage the property is usually
expressly given to the trustee. Second, where such power is not given, it is often
implied by the courts to effect the trust's purposes. Third, a trustee can usually
procure court consent to such a transaction, basing such deviation on doctrines like
those of changed circumstances in case of private trusts, and cy pres in case of
charitable trusts. It has long been established that equity has power to order conversion
of land held in trust, even against the settlor's expressed intention to the contrary.
BOGERT, ThusTs AND TRUSTEES, §§ 561, 562 (2d ed. 1960); 2 & 4 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 167
399 (2d ed. 1956); 4 Sisxs & SmrrH § 1941 n.2; Schnebly, supra note 11, at 61 n.121.
Limitations on the duration of future interests and those on their enforcement
because of changed conditions will not be considered here nor will termination of
future interests because of prescription, adverse possession, or impossibility of per-
formance of conditions. As to these, see 4 SnIms & SMITH cbs. 58-60. Likewise, general
policy rules restricting the creation or enforcement of future interests and conditions
such as the rule against perpetuities, restraints on alienation, and illegal conditions
and limitations will not be directly considered. As to these, see GRAy, THE RULE
AGAIN T PEETUIIrrEs (4th ed. 1942); LEAca & TuDoa, THE RULE AGAINST PER-
s'm-urrmS (1957); 3 SAms & SmtrrH pt. 4; and the many excellent articles by Professor
Browder, including Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage, 39 MIcH. L.
REV. 1288 (1941); Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-examined, 49 COLUM.
L. REv. 320 (1949); Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of Illegality, 47 MICH.
L. REv. 759 (1949); Illegal Conditions and Limitations-Miscellaneous Provisions, 1
OKLA. L. REv. 237 (1948).
The other major area wherein much has been done in recent years to facilitate
alienability of land subject to future interests is that of limiting the duration and
enforcement of powers of termination and possibilities of reverter. Among the more
outstanding works on this topic are Snvms & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 3, tit. 19;
Fike, Problems Relating to Stale Reverters and Restrictions, 38 NEB. L. REv. 150
(1959); Hammond, Limitations Upon Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry




I. IN ABSENCE OF STATUTE
Beginning just over a century ago, the courts of the United States
first began to recognize the doctrine that under certain conditions
equity has the power to sell the entire fee simple estate in land
encumbered with future interests and to establish a trust to hold and
distribute the proceeds of the sale according to the terms of the
original grant.13 A few courts at first denied such jurisdiction,14 but
no case has been found since Professor Schnebly's article appeared
well over thirty years ago in which the court did not recognize the
general doctrine. At least the general tenet is well established.
However, the scope of this equity jurisdiction still remains sub-
stantially undefined, despite a relatively large number of cases in-
voking it. This lack of definition seems primarily attributable to three
reasons. First, many of the cases have nearly identical fact situations
and pleadings, thus providing little breadth of treatment by the
courts. Second, the courts have not always been consistent in either
their application or discussion of the rule. Finally, the large number
of statutes dealing with this problem area have precluded full judicial
development of the rule.
Nevertheless, certain principles can be drawn from the decisions,
and inferences from their language. These will be examined in terms
of (1) those persons who have legal capacity to initiate the equity
proceeding, (2) the circumstances under which relief is granted, and
(3) the kind of relief granted.
A. Who May Sue?
When the cases are reduced to their common elements, there are
only two basic situations under which the equitable relief is likely to
be sought that are important to distinguish for the purpose of de-
termining who may bring the action:
(1) Where the possessory and future interests (either vested or
contingent) are owned wholly by adults sui juris; and
(2) Where either the possessory or future interests (either vested
or contingent) involve possible minors', unknown persons', or unborn
persons' interests.
If all the interests are owned by adults sui juris, the property can
be conveyed if all of them join in the conveyance, whether the future
13. The first case recognizing such power appears to be Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq.
1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850).
14. E.g., Stansbury v. Inglehart, 9 Mackey (20 D.C.) 134 (1891); Hoskins v. Ames,
78 Miss. 986, 29 So. 828 (1901); Losey v. Stanley, 147 N.Y. 560, 42 N.E. 8 (1895).
It should be noted that statutes or subsequent decisions recognize the power to sell
land encumbered by future interests in all these jurisdictions today.
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interests are vested or contingent.'5 If the future interests are in-
defeasibly vested, they may be universally transferred with or without
the possessory owner's consent. Even as a practical matter a considera-
tion approaching their full value may usually be acquired. If the
future interests are contingent or vested subject to divestment, a sale
which is advantageous to all the parties will in all probability receive
their voluntary consent and promote agreement in apportioning the
proceeds. If the owner of the possessory estate or the future interest
be obstinate, or sentimental, or if he wishes to avoid a sale because of
its adverse tax consequences to him, or because he believes the land is
rapidly appreciating in value, he might not join in a sale. Such refusal
on the part of a remainderman might mean that the life tenant will
find his life estate so tenuous and the land so unprofitable that he will
derive little or no gain from it. If the life tenant refuses to join, and
the land is threatened by loss for taxes or otherwise, the remainder-
man will stand to lose as well as the life tenant. While in most cases
the parties will consent to some plan to protect their interests, there is
a need for a remedy in the occasional exceptional case. But if the feel-
ings of an adult owner are so intense in opposition to a sale, should
a court of equity substitute its judgment that the sale is advantageous
for his, as well as for that of the creator of the interests, and order the
land sold? Would the court be denying the objecting party the rights
the creator of the interest intended he should have, thus interfering
with property rights beyond justifiable limits? Certainly the attitude
that for equity to order the sale would be an unwarranted interference
long prevailed.' 6
However, in 1944 the Minnesota court in Beliveau v. Beliveau'7
ordered a sale of the property where all interests were vested in
adults sui juris. In this case a testator left property to his widow for
life with remainders in specified portions to his brothers and sister.
The widow was also given a power coupled with her life estate to sell
and dispose of the property in fee simple, and to use the proceeds of
any sale for her comfort and support. The testator further directed
15. While in a few states it is still questionable whether all non-vested future inter-
ests are freely alienable, there is no doubt that any future interest may be conveyed
by way of a deed which constitutes a release. 3 S]ms & SMrrh §§ 1855, 1857-59.
16. See Schnebly, supra note 11, at 56.
17. Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 14 N.W.2d 360 (1944). Although the
facts as given by the court contain no express mention of the ages of the parties, the
author believes their majority is a proper inference from the facts given:
(1) The remaindermen were plaintiffs, and no reference is found that any were
represented by guardian.
(2) The remaindermen were the brothers and sister of the deceased testator who
had died eight years before the trial of the case. The life tenant was the testator's
widow, age 66 at the time of trial. This indicates that the testator was probably elderly
and would not likely have had minor brothers or sister.
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that if the income were "suffcient to properly care for, support, and
maintain my said wife, then I prefer that my real estate be kept in-
tact." Eight years after the testator's death, the widow, age sixty-six,
was unable and unwilling to operate and maintain the property. The
buildings and fences had fallen into serious disrepair, and were not
insured. Weeds had infested the farm. If properly managed, the
farm would have rented for about 1,100 dollars per year, but in its
depreciated condition it brought only 600 to 800 dollars. The life
tenant had not paid the interest on a mortgage on the land or taxes
thereon, and the land had been sold at an execution sale and at a
mortgage foreclosure sale. She had made no attempt to redeem
from either sale. On a bill brought by the remaindermen, the lower
court ordered, over the objections of the life tenant, that a trustee be
appointed to take charge of the land, including the widow's homestead
property, and to preserve it; and directed and empowered the trustee
to sell the property, .to mortgage the property pending the sale to
raise funds with which to redeem from the execution and mortgage
foreclosure sales and to pay the expenses of the proceedings, and to
rent the property until the sale. Upon the sale, the proceeds were
distributed to pay the back taxes, to redeem from the mortgage fore-
closure sale, to redeem from the sale under execution, to pay the
fees of the attorneys for both the life tenant and the remaindermen.
The trustee was directed to hold the balance for the comfort and
support of the life tenant and on her death to pay the balance to the
remaindermen. The Supreme Court of Minnesota found no error.18
It should be especially noted that the sale was ordered in this
case despite the facts that the testator gave the life tenant a broad
discretionary power to consume the property for her own comfort and
support; that the testator expressed a strong desire to keep the
property intact, with exception to be made only for the care, support,
and maintenance of the life tenant; that a portion of the property
was homestead property of the life tenant; that the life tenant vigor-
ously objected to the sale; and that the parties all had legal capacity.
The court relied explicitly upon its inherent source of power as a
court of equity to, allow such remedy to these parties on the broad
justification of the maxim that where there is a right there is a
remedy.19
With equity adopting such a sweeping basis for the power and
18. Ibid.
19. "Where, because of an exigency endangering the rights of the owners of
property given in present and future interests, it is necessary to preserve the property
and to protect such interests, courts have inherent equitable jurisdiction to order a
judicial sale of the entire fee, and to appoint a trustee to conduct the sale and to
reinvest the proceeds of the sale for the benefit of the holders of the respective interests
in the property sold ..
"The rule is said to be one of American origin and development, for which there are
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having demonstrated a willingness to order such sales, it would appear
that any party owning any interest in the land would have standing
to pursue the remedy.
If equity can order a sale on the petition of an adult owner when
all the holders of interests in the property have legal capacity to deal
with that property, then certainly an owner of any interest would
have standing where some estate therein is in an infant or in an
unborn or unknown person. Where some interest exists in an infant
or unascertained person, a purchaser can not acquire a marketable
title because no group of persons can be determined who have
capacity to give a good fee simple. If only those interests which can
be separately sold, such as the life estates or the alienable future
interests of those having capacity to convey are sold apart from the
fee simple the result is often to sacrifice them. Thus the property is
encumbered to a far greater extent than if the owners are known and
have legal capacity. A court authorized sale, lease, or mortgage of the
fee simple estate, binding upon the owners of all interests in the land,
with a trust of the proceeds, is the most practical expedient for pro-
tecting the interests of all, even though it extinguishes or encumbers
their interests in the particular tract.
Where an inffant owns an interest in the property-possessory,
vested, or contingent-the courts have no difficulty in ordering its
sale, most often on the rationale that equity has an inherent power
to protect the property rights and interests of minors. 2 Equity has a
similar power over the property of those unknown or unborn.21 This
power extends even to those cases where the effect is to extinguish
the future interests, vested2 and contingent, of other owners, includ-
no English precedents. But the absence of precedents is . . . no reason for not applying
well-settled principles of equity. A court of equity has the power to adopt its decree
to the exigencies of each particular case so as to accomplish justice. It is traditional
and characteristic of equity that it possesses the flexibility and expansiveness to invent
new remedies or modify old ones to meet the requirements of every case and to
satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition. Equity has not been rendered
entirely inflexible by the precedents of bygone ages. Just as courts may erect con-
structive trusts as remedial devices to enable them to do justice in particular cases,
they may create trusts having all the characteristics of an express trust to do justice
in a particular case. The judicial creation of a trust to afford an adequate remedy,
where there otherwise would be none, for a right is but a manifestation of equity's
capacity to grow and to fit its remedies to the demands of justice in the particular case.
It is justified under the maxim that where there is a right there is a remedy." Id. at
245, 14 N.W.2d at 365-66. (Citations omitted.)
20. E.g., Hine v. Morse, 218 U.S. 493 (1910); Christopher v. Chadwick, 223 Ala.
230, 135 So. 454 (1931); Ethridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1, 108 S.E. 543 (1921).
21. E.g., Wing v. Wing, 212 Ark. 960, 208 S.W.2d 776 (1948); Coquillard v.
Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 489, 113 N.E. 481 (1916).
22. E.g., Holt v. Hamlin, 120 Tenn. 496, 111 S.W. 241 (1908).
23. E.g., Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410 (1879); American See. & Trust Co. v.
Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367 (D.D.C. 1959); Cauffiel v. Cauffiel, 161 A.2d 432 (Del.
Ch. 1960); Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898).
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ing adults sui juris.24 There remains doubt in the minds of most
authorities whether all courts would order the sale on the suit of the
future interest owner against objecting possessory owners.25 However,
the Beliveau decision 6 is at least some authority that equity has such
power, and in light of various recognized trends,27 it would appear
that any owner, adult or infant, of any interest, present or future,
vested or contingent, would have standing to sue to have the land
sold, assuming the presence of the other requisite circumstances.
B. Bases for Sale
Probably the most difficult determination from the decisions is the
circumstances under which a court of equity will decree such a sale.
The arguments are often presented that such sale defeats the intent
of the creator of the interest, and it interferes unjustifiably with
property rights by converting the interests in unique land to some
other form. The courts' answer to these charges is that all interests
will be lost if the land is not sold, and thus the courts are actually
effectuating the creator's intent by preserving some property where
otherwise there would be nothing left. The basis for many of the
cases which have allowed land to be sold, therefore, is the prevention
of loss of the property when it does not produce income sufficient to
meet payment on taxes and other encumbrances. 28  However, such
position is defensible only when the courts insist on a showing that the
sale is necessary to prevent loss of the property. This requirement of
necessity to prevent loss thus remains in some states, although it need
not be shown that sale is the only expedient by which loss can be
preventedP For example, the Iowa court has stated that the power
of equity to sell the land
24. E.g., Reed v. Alabama & G. Iron Co., 107 Fed. 586 (C.C. Ga. 1901); Bofil v.
Fisher, supra note 13.
25. RESTATEMENT, PEO RTY § 179 (1936); 4 SriEs & SxiT § 1944; cf. Schnebly,
supra note 11, at 56-60.
26. Supra note 17.
27. "Moreover, one can not fail to recognize the tendency of the law today toward
a greater degree of marketability of land . . . . The development in the direction of
judicial sales of land affected with future interests to avoid loss is in line with this
trend." 3 Snvrzs & Smr § 1941. "There is a growing conviction that it is just and
wise to make land as valuable to the life tenant as is possible without prejudice to the
remainderman. The ownership of land has lost something of the peculiar sanctity which
formerly enveloped it, and today the disposition is to consider more the value
element involved and less the element of possessory right." Schnebly, supra note 11, at
54.
28. E.g., Christopher v. Chadwick, supra note 20; Caufllel v. Cauffiel, supra note 23;
Gavin v. Curtin, supra note 23.
29. E.g., Gavin v. Curtin, supra note 23; Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552, 69
N.E. 1 (1903); Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra note 21; Cagle v. Schaefer, 115 S.C.
35, 104 S.E. 321 (1920).
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will not be exercised unless it clearly appears that unless the property
is sold and the proceeds invested it will be entirely lost to those entitled
thereto. In other words, the court's power in this respect will be invoked
only as a matter of extreme necessity, and only in such cases, because if
exercised under any other circumstances, it would be an unwarranted inter-
ference with the express intent of the testator. 30
Even in these states which persist in requiring proof of necessity
of sale to prevent loss, however, the degree of necessity, and the facts
which constitute that degree of necessity, are still far from established.
Thus Illinois refuses to order a sale of land in the absence of "necessity
of the most urgent character."3' Iowa, as seen, employs the test of
"extreme necessity"; 32 South Carolinam and Delaware34 require "rea-
sonable necessity"; while Indiana insists only upon "practical neces-
sity."3  Other courts merely require that the sale be "necessary"
without further refinement.36 Nor is the word "necessary" itself always
employed. "Essential,"37 "advantageous,"3 8 "highly advantageous,"39
of "high expediency,"40 "convenience,"4 "need,"4 and the most preval-
ent of all, to preserve the property for the "best interests" of the
parties,43 are typical of the many terms employed as tests of suffici-
ency.
However, the foundation of the jurisdiction being necessity of sale
to prevent loss has proved too narrow a basis for many courts, and
they have sought ways of avoiding its limitations. While they still
insist on the requirement of "necessity" or some equivalent or similar
test, some have begun to drop or substitute another requirement for
that of the preservation of the property from loss. These terms, of
course, have the effect of neutralizing the acid test of necessity as well.
Thus the requirement in these states is no longer that the sale is
ccnecessary to prevent loss of the property." Their tests have become
30. Traversy v. Bell, 195 Iowa 1243, 1249, 193 N.W. 439, 442 (1923). (Emphasis
added.)
31. Gibbs v. Andrews, 299 Ill. 510, 517, 132 N.E. 544, 547 (1921).
32. Traversy v. Bell, supra note 30.
33. Caine v. Griffin, 232 S.C. 562, 103 S.E.2d 37 (1958); Cagle v. Schaefer, supra
note 29.
34. Cauffiel v. Cauffiel, supra note 23.
35. Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra note 21.
36. E.g., Phinizy v. Wallace, 136 Ga. 520, 71 S.E. 896 (1911); Ruggles v. Tyson,
104 Wis. 500,79 N.W. 766 (1899).
37. Gavin v. Curtin, supra note 23.
38. Phinizy v. Wallace, supra note 36.
39. Bedford v. Bedford, 105 Ark. 587, 152 S.W. 129 (1912).
40. Mayall v. Mayall, 63 Minn. 511, 65 N.W. 942 (1896).
41. Gassenheimer v. Gassenheimer, 108 Ala. 653, 18 So. 520 (1895) (dictum).
42. Lambdin v. Lambdin, 209 Miss. 672, 48 So.2d 341 (1950).
43. E.g., Walker v. Blaney, 225 Ark. 918, 286 S.W.2d 479 (1956); Palmer Brick
Co. v. Woodward, 135 Ga. 450, 69 S.E. 827 (1910).
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whether the sale is "necessary to promote the interest of the minor,"44
or "necessary for the best interests of the parties."45
A number of courts, however, are less concerned with the charge
that the sale is an unwarranted interference with property rights, and
easily justify their decrees on other bases than the prevention of loss
of the property. They do not demand a showing that the sale is
necessary to preserve the property from loss, although that showing
usually is made even when it is not the stated reason for the decision.
Thus some sales are decreed on the rationale that equity has jurisdic-
tion over all matters where the property of minors or unborn persons
is involved.46 Others proceed on the basis of extending the well-
established trust doctrine that a trustee may be authorized to convert
trust assets, even against the settlor's intents, in order to uphold the
primary purpose of the trust.47 Having the power to authorize those
sales, equity may order a sale of land and create a trust in its proceeds
to prevent frustration of the grantor's interest through loss of the
property.48 Still other grounds are found for sustaining the sales:
prevention of waste,49 conservation of natural resources,50 effectuation
of the donor's intent where otherwise it would be defeated because
of unforeseen changes in circumstances,51 and where a sale which had
clearly been to the remaindermen's benefit was not challenged until
many years later, laches and estoppel.5?
From such broad bases, even more elusive grounds have sprung
to sustain decrees of sale. While taking on various forms, all the above
explanations nevertheless have their roots in the basic factor of the
welfare of the minor or unascertained future interest owner. While
such noble purpose is easily defensible despite its form, can equity
defend its actions when the relief is to the primary or exclusive benefit
of the present adult possessory owner? It has long been recognized
that even when the court does not speak directly of the plight of the
life tenant, recognition that the sale will relieve his unfortunate cir-
cumstances surely influences the judges to a substantial extent.5 3
44. Christopher v. Chadwick, 223 Ala. 230, 135 So. 454 (1931).
45. Walker v. Blaney, supra note 43.
46. E.g., Hine v. Morse, 218 U.S. 493 (1910); Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410
(1879); Ethridge v. Pitts, 151 Ga. 1, 108 S.E. 543 (1921).
47. See note 11 supra, and authorities cited therein.
48. E.g., Phinizy v. Wallace, 136 Ga. 520, 71 S.E. 896 (1911); Mayall v. Mayall,
supra note 40.
49. Wigal v. Hensley, 214 Ark. 409, 216 S.W.2d 792 (1949); Cauffiel v. Cauffiel,
supra note 23.
50. Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941).
51. E.g., Curtis v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862); Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra note
21; Whitten v. Whitten, 203 Okla. 196, 219 P.2d 228 (1950).
52. Hardy v. Hilton, 211 Ark. 991, 204 S.W.2d 163 (1947).
53. Schuebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remaindermen To Extinguish Other Interests
by Judicial Process, 42 HAEv. L. REv. 30, 60 (1928).
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Many of the decisions place great emphasis on the hardship to the life
tenant and his needs, 54 and such hardship is almost certainly the key
factor in several of those cases. Even so, the hardship must be real.
The earlier cases were also firm in their insistence that equity lacked
authority to order a sale for reinvestment merely beneficial to the
possessory owner, no matter his plight.55 But at least two recent
decisions provide reason for believing this is no longer true. In Caine
v. Griffin,56 the life tenant petitioned for a declaratory judgment that
she be allowed to exchange the tract of land subject to the future
interests for another tract of equal value to be held according to the
same terms. There was no indication that the contingent remainder-
men would in any way be benefited nor that the property was in any
danger of being lost. The evidence was that the new tract would
bring in a higher income, the life tenant needed that additional in-
come to live-her husband being incapacitated-and to repair other
property of the testator. The South Carolina court found that there
was a "reasonable necessity for exchange," and ordered the exchange
as being in the "'decided best interest' of all parties."
The District of Columbia case of American Security & Trust Co. v.
Crame5 7 probably presents the broadest relief and the most elusive
basis of all for sale by equity. Property was held in trust for a widow,
sixty-two years old, for life, with the principal in remainder to her
heirs. The bill of the life tenant and her adult children stated that
she was in need not merely of a better investment, but of the corpus
itself, and they desired to terminate the trust and have the corpus
paid to her. The sale was allowed upon her furnishing a bond to
protect unascertained remaindermen. The court noted the above facts
and the settlor's interest in the life tenant, including his desire to
protect her. The additional reason the court gave for the sale was
"the realities of the situation."58 Thus it is seen that equity does
indeed have the broad discretionary power to provide a remedy where
it finds there is a right.
One other ground for allowing the sale, the benefit to society, is
54. E.g., Bofil v. Fisher, supra note 13. ("Here also is a suffering family, who may
obtain relief by the action of the court.").
55. E.g., Gassenheimer v. Gassenheimer, supra note 41; Gibbs v. Andrews, supra
note 31; Thompson v. Adams, supra note 29; Traversy v. Bell, supra note 30 (dictum);
Cagle v. Schaefer, supra note 29.
56. 232 S.C. 562, 103 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
57. 175 F. Supp. 367 (D.D.C., 1959). This case involved a trust, but its principles
are no different. See Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1926).
58. For an almost identical case, see Frank v. Frank, supra note 57. Of course
these decisions still have not solved the general problem, because the required bond
will be directly proportional to the likelihood of the occurrence upon which the
condition is limited. If this is great, the bond might be nearly as large as the principal,
with little or no resulting benefit to the life tenant.
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often discussed and included to bolster the court's action, but no case
can be found where it alone is the basis of the decision. Obviously
such benefit cannot be measured, especially in the isolated cases the
courts are called upon to decide. The amount of importance to
be attached to such factors varies with the attitude of the court. But
the interest of society does influence the courts in this matter. As
stated in the opinion of the very first case to allow such a sale:
To say that the Court could not under circumstances like these convey
away the fee, would be to assert a doctrine that would render.., contingent
remainders an intolerable evil to a growing and prosperous community.
Thus to shackle estates without power of relief, unless every person having
a contingent and possible interest could be brought before the court . . .
would be to sacrifice the rights and interests of the present generation to
those of posterity, and of citizens to aliens.59
C. Remedies
As has been seen, by far the most common remedy of equity in
these cases is to order a sale of the entire estate, and after such sale
the rights of the parties are transferred to the proceeds of the sale,
which is held in trust, the present possessory owner receiving the
interest from the fund, and the remaindermen receiving the prin-
cipal upon termination of the particular interests.60 The court merely
shifts the interests from the land itself to the fund representing its
value, and administers the proceeds as nearly as possible as the lands
would have been administered had there been no conversion of the
property. Thus the rights of the parties are preserved in all respects
except the specific property involved. This remedy, in most instances,
seems the most effective, for it protects the interests of all persons,
while carrying into effect the primary purpose of the creator of the
interests.
In granting the same general remedy, the courts permit a sale of
only a portion of the land, including minerals, for the purpose of
protecting the balance6' or preserving the portion sold.62 Likewise
59. Bofil v. Fisher, supra note 13, at 6.
60. Nearly all cases cited above granted this described remedy. For typical discussion
of it, see Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra note 51; Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235,
14 N.W.2d 360 (1944); Des Champs v. Mims, 143 S.C. 52, 145 S.E. 623 (1928).
61. Ethridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1, 108 S.E. 543 (1921). A plantation of 1600 acres
had been willed in 1859 to the testator's daughter who became a widow soon there-
after, with contingent remainders to her minor children. The tenements, fences, and
most personalty were destroyed by Sherman's army and the slaves were emancipated.
Neither the life tenant nor the remaindermen had other property. The land in its
ravished state could be neither worked nor leased, and there was no income to pay
taxes. One 200-acre tract was not contiguous to the other 1400 acres, and the life tenant
petitioned to sell the small tract to provide proceeds to rebuild the remainder of the
plantation. The court allowed the sale.
62. Wigal v. Hensley, 214 Ark. 409, 216 S.W.2d 792 (1949). The court permitted
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they allow the property to be exchanged for another tract of land
inasmuch as this is equivalent to sale of the land and reinvestment in
the new tract.6 Allowances are permitted out of the fund for expenses
in connection with the sale, attorney's fees, and satisfaction of
encumbrances which would otherwise cause the property to be lost.
64
While the remedy of sale and investment of the proceeds in trust is
the usual one, others should not be overlooked. Immediate distribu-
tion of the assets may be allowed if necessary for the support and
education of the minor remaindermen.65 Property in South Carolina
was left to A for life, and on her death to her children then living,
"the child of any deceased child taking the parent's share, if none
then be living" then to the testator's heirs. On the bill of A and all
living remaindermen except one, sale was ordered. The proceeds,
directed the court, should be distributed to pay taxes due on the land;
to pay the costs of the action, including attorneys' fees; to discharge
an indebtedness secured by mortgage of A's life estate; and the
balance towards the support and maintenance of A's children,
including expenses of attending college. 66  No provision was in-
cluded in the decree to protect unborn contingent remainder-
men. The court apparently felt that the unascertained contingent
remainders were sufficiently remote to justify their being ex-
tinguished altogether for the more immediately needed support and
education of the children of A in whom the property would most
probably vest if not sold. This decision seems to be nearing the limits
of discretion, even for equity.
Most of the decisions allow the life tenant the interest on the fund,
but firmly refuse to distribute immediately to him the value of his life
estate based on mortality tables. 67 Their primary reason seems to
be that such distribution would constitute an unauthorized infringe-
ment upon the testator's intent, but of nearly equal weight is the
impossibility of adequately protecting the remaindermen if any of
the fund is disbursed.6 8 However, a few of the cases make it quite
clear that if the exigencies of the case require it, equity has full
power to order a separation of the possessory and future estates, and
mature timber to be sold to prevent its deterioration from moisture and bugs and to
protect it from possible fire and wind losses.
63. Christopher v. Chadwick, 223 Ala. 260, 135 So. 454 (1931); Caine v. Griffin,
supra note 56.
64. Beliveau v. Beliveau, supra note 60; Workman v. Workman, 174 S.C. 490,
178 S.E. 121 (1935); Ruggles v. Tyson, 104 Wis. 500, 79 N.W. 766, (1899).
65. Workman v. Workman, supra note 64; cf. Reed v. Alabama & G. Iron Co.,
107 Fed. 586 (C.C. Ga. 1901).
66. ibid.
67. E.g., Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra note 21; Ruggles v. Tyson, supra note 64.
68. E.g., Gassenheimer v. Gassenheimer, supra note 41; Coquillard v. Coquillard,
supra note 21; Des Champs v. Mims, supra note 60.
1964] 1449
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to make immediate distribution of a lump sum of the value of his
life estate to the life tenant, holding the balance in an annuity to
accumulate to the full value for the remaindermen. 6a And in one case
where the contingency was remote, the Tennessee court ordered the
entire proceeds paid to an elderly childless life tenant upon her giving
a bond to protect any child she might have who would be a re-
mainderman.
70
Equity has full power to authorize a mortgage, rather than a sale,
of the property which is binding upon the possessory and future
owners in order to pay taxes, make repairs, or discharge encumbrances
where necessary for the preservation of the interests.7' Likewise, it
would seem the court can authorize a lease which extends beyond
the present possessory estate.
72
II. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR SALE
This principle, permitting sale under judicial decree of land encum-
bered by future interests to prevent loss, is provided by statute under
certain conditions in the majority of jurisdictions today.73 The acts
vary, however, rather extensively in their terms, and are even more
difficult to draw general conclusions from than are the decisions.
As was done with the case law in the absence of statute, the statutory
provisions will be generally examined from the viewpoints of (1)
those persons who have legal capacity to initiate the proceeding,
(2) the circumstances under which relief is granted, and (3) the
remedies provided.
Although several of the statutes permit the holder of any interest,
possessory or future, to initiate the proceeding, 74 most limit the
exercise of the power. There are several states which bar the owner of
69. E.g., Whitten v. Whitten, 203 Okla. 196, 219 P.2d 228 (1950); ef. Ethridge v.
Pitts, supra note 61.
70. Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1926). The court required
the bond, even though recognizing the life tenant was beyond an age where child-
bearing was possible, because they could not bring themselves to break away from
the conclusive presumption of the capacity to have offspring. See also American
Sec. & Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367 (D.D.C. 1959).
71. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dower, 222 Iowa 1377, 271 N.W. 193
(1937); Whitfield v. Lyon, 93 Miss. 443, 46 So. 545 (1908); McDavid v. McDavid,
187 S.C. 127, 197 S.E. 204 (1938).
72. Ragland v. Ragland, 146 Kan. 103, 68 P.2d 1100 (1937); Robinson v. Barrett,
142 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587 (1935).
73. 4 Snvms & Sm m § 1946; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 179 (Supp. 1948). No
attempt will be made herein to analyze each of these statutes specifically. For other
discussion of them, see Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish
Other Interests by Judicial Process, 42 HAv. L. REv. 30, 62 (1928); Note, 33 IowA
L. BEv. 692 (1948); RESTATEMENT, POPEaRTY § 179 (Supp. 1948).




any future interest from bringing the action, limiting its initiation only
to possessory owners.75 Others allow the action to be brought by
the possessory owners and holders of indefeasibly vested remainders
or reversions.76 A few add contingent remaindermen to that list.77
One state limits the action to life tenants with the consent of the
reversioner. 8 It should be noted that many of these statutes restrict
the class of persons who can maintain the action to a considerably
smaller group than can normally sue at equity in the absence of
statute.
The statutes are equally as variable in their provisions setting
forth the bases for granting relief. The first determination is whether
the statute applies to the particular interests involved. Some are so
broad as to encompass property subject to any future interest what-
soever.79 A few are limited to those situations where some interests
are contingent, or at least not indefeasibly vested, future interests.80
Still others designate specified future interests which must be present.81
While on the one hand some apply only where land is held in trust,82
on the other hand some are limited to holdings of legal future interests
in land.8 It should be once again noted that in this matter many
of the statutes are far more restrictive than is equity in the absence
of statute.
Nor are the grounds for directing the sale of the property much
more clearly defined by the legislatures than by the courts, although
most acts are so broadly worded that the sale may be ordered without
proof of necessity to prevent loss. Missouri has one of the most strict
of the statutes. In general terms it announces the test to be whether
the estate is "burdensome and unprofitable," but then it goes on to
require a showing that taxes, assessments, and other expenses of
maintaining the property exceed its income, and that a greater
income can probably be derived from the proceeds of the sale in-
vested in government or school bonds or in first lien mortgage loans
on land located in Missouri.84 Other states are less strict. As examples,
75. E.g., C.. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 752, 763; Mo. REV. STAT. § 528.010 (1959);
OHIo REV. CODE § 11925 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3-6401 (1957).
76. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 389.040 (1962).
77. E.g., N.H. REv. LAws ch. 259, § 28 (1942); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3543 (1955).
78. IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.9 (1950).
79. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2426 (Burns 1946); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 252
(1957); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 183, § 49 (1958). A number of these and others
apply to personal property as well as to land.
80. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 22, § 50 (1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 154, § 4
(1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (Supp. 1963).
81. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 389.040 (1962), is limited to "remainder and contingent
interest"; IowA CODE ANN. § 557.9 (1950), specifies "expectant estate."
82. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 58, §§ 57, 58, 59 (1940).
83. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 154, § 4 (1954).
84. Mo. REv. STAT. § 528.010 (1959).
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Michigan authorizes the sale if the interested parties' rights "will
otherwise be jeopardized,"85 or if the rights of all the parties "will
be substantially promoted," or if the land is "unproductive, or for
any perculiar [sic] reasons or circumstances."86 Ohio requires showing
of an affirmative advantage to the petitioner and the absence of
substantial hardship or disadvantage to any of the other owners.87
Indiana requires only that "it appear to be advantageous to the parties
concerned,"8 Connecticut that it "better promote the interests of the
owners,"89 and Illinois and Pennsylvania that the sale be shown to
be "expedient."90 California's statute is probably the least strict.
Proceeding through the medium of a partition sale and securing
immediate distribution of the proceeds to those having interests in
the land, a life tenant may have the property sold apparently at
his pleasure without proof of necessity or even expediency, the only
limitation being that it be done "without great prejudice to the
parties."91 A few statutes allow the sale only if it is not expressly
prohibited in the creating instrument,92 but New York permits it even
contrary to an express prohibition.93
As far as the specific remedy is concerned, most of the statutes
provide, as do the courts of equity in absence of statute, that the
proceeds shall be reinvested and shall be governed in their distribu-
tion by the same limitations as the interests sold.9 4 The advantages
of this remedy are apparent: it insures that no one is injured by the
sale, and it prevents the life tenant's receiving a windfall at the
expense of the remaindermanf 5 Unless commutation is provided
for by consent of the parties 96 or is expressly provided for by the
statute, the courts have generally held that distribution of a lump
sum based on mortality tables is unauthorized.97 Some statutes,
however, have expressly authorized commutation at the discretion of
the court.98
85. MIcH. Comp. LAws § 619.62 (1948).
86. Micn. COmi. LAws § 619.66 (1948).
87. OGao BREv. CODE § 11925 (1953).
88. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2426 (Bums 1946).
89. CoNN. GEr. STAT. § 52-500 (1958).
90. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 22, § 50 (1959); PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1561 (1936).
91. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 752.
92. E.g., MIcE. CoMP. LAws § 619.62 (1948); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 45-1101 (1951).
93. N.Y. RAL PRoP. ACTIONS LAw § 1604.
94. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2426 (Burns 1946); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183,
§ 51 (1958).
95. See Matter of Gaffers, 254 App. Div. 448, 5 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1938).
96. See Brierly v. Brierly, 81 N.H. 133, 124 Atl. 311 (1933); Wyman v. Newberry,
31 Ohio App. 317, 167 N.E. 414 (1929).
97. Wilhite v. Rathbum, 332 Mo. 1208, 61 S.W.2d 708 (1933); Connole v. Connole,
45 R.I. 1, 119 AtI. 321 (1923).
98. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 752; N.Y. REAL PnoP. ACTIONS LAW § 1613.
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Various other forms of relief are sometimes provided by the statutes.
The power to execute a mortgage of the fee binding on future interest
holders is occasionally granted.9 So is the power to execute a lease
extending beyond the present possessory interest.1' °
One other legislative remedy should be mentioned. Occasionally
special and private acts have been passed to authorize the sale of
property subject to future interests, with the effect that the future
interests are extinguished. Such legislation has generally been sus-
tained by the courts as valid.1 1 Legislation is generally upheld as
a constitutional exercise of the state's police power which does not
deprive any of the owners of their property without due process of
law. 02 This conclusion is sometimes reached by the line of reasoning
that it results in only a substitution of one type of property for
another, but at other times it is upheld exclusively on the basis of
the state's police power. The statutes are generally upheld even
where the interest terminated is vested, and whether it was created
before'03 or after'0 4 passage of the act.
III. Furru DEVELOPMENTS
As has been seen, while the development in this area has been
extensive both with regard to judicial and statutory activity, it has
often been inconsistent and inadequate. Courts and legislatures have
answered some questions, while leaving others unanswered. There
is a definite need for further legislation in the field, although it is
often met with resistance and the usual argument that its operation
frustrates the intention of the testator. While one's right to dispose
of his property as he desires, especially in normal family arrangements,
is not a right to be tampered with lightly, factors on the other side
should also be considered. How many testators intend to tie up
land to such extent that it might be lost without remuneration rather
than sold? Indeed how many testators intend that their nondisposa-
ble future interests should render the property unprofitable, burden-
99. E.g., ILL. RE~V. STAT. cb. 22, § 50 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (Supp.
1963).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (Supp. 1963).
101. E.g., Love v. McDonald, 20 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941); Ebling v.
Dreyer, 149 N.Y. 460, 44 N.E. 155 (1896).
102. E.g., Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 109 (1876); Garrison v. Hecker, 128
Mich. 539, 87 N.W. 642 (1901); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 209 N.C. 673, 184 S.E.
527 (1936). For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the validity of these
statutes, see ScunaocK, RETROAcTivE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTEREsTS IN LA ND-
163-82 (1953).
103. Wilhite v. Rathburn, supra note 97. Contra, Ream v. Wolls, 61 Ohio St. 131,
55 N.E. 176 (1899).
104. Smith's Estate, 207 Pa. 604, 57 Atl. 37 (1904). Contra, Curtis v. Hiden, 117 Va.
289, 84 S.E. 664 (1915).
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some, or even inconvenient for their devisees? The public interest
certainly is against limitations which hamper or prevent the produc-
tive use of land.
What kind of legislation best fulfills the need? There is no apparent
practical type of statute which can dispense with the necessity of
judicial action to solve the problem.105 But what of the action itself?
First, there seems no valid reason for restricting the petitioner to
some special category of interest-holder. Thus, the owner of any
present or future interest or estate in land should be allowed to in-
stitute the proceeding.
Second, the statute must, to be effective, be binding on all who
have or may get any interest, whether vested or contingent. Since
these might include minors, unascertained, or unborn persons, pro-
vision must be made for representation of such interests, normally
by the appointment of guardians ad litem and application of the
doctrine of virtual representation.
Third, proof of necessity to prevent loss should not be required.
Rather, showing the court that such action would be generally ad-
vantageous to the parties involved would give needed breadth. At
the same time, such provision would give adequate protection to
other interested parties who could defeat its operation by proof of
substantial disadvantage, hardship, or loss to themselves. This gives
the court a considerable amount of discretion which is necessary in
light of the great variety of circumstances covered by this type
proceeding, even though subject to the criticism that such discretion
provides less certainty.
Fourth, provision for distribution of the proceeds must be included.
The preferable alternative is that already taken by the majority
of states-to have a trustee appointed to hold the proceeds in trust
on the same limitations as applied to the land. This approach would
protect the interests of all persons, and carry into effect the primary
purpose of the creator of the interests, not allowing one holder to
unfairly profit at another's expense. However, the other solution-to
immediately allocate the proceeds to the interested persons on the
basis of mortality tables, as in a partition sale-more effectively clears
the title from the conveyancer's viewpoint. But it has the drawback
that if the possessory owner should die decidedly sooner than the
table shows he should, the future interest holder is severely penalized.
These proposals are not new. Substantially the same type legis-
lation suggested here has been proposed previously in a student note
in the Iowa Law Review 1 6 and by Professor Simes in his Model Act
105. SmES & TAYLOR, ThE IMPROVEmENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEcISLATION, 236-
37 (1960).
106. Note, 33 IowA L. REv. 692, 702 (1948).
1454 [ VOL. 17
REMOVAL OF ENCUMBRANCES
Providing for the Sale of Real Estate Affected with a Future In-
terest.0 7 Such legislation, however, while having much merit, is
difficult and slow to get enacted. Where inadequate statutes already
exist it is even harder to reform them.
Therefore, the most important question is how to proceed in the
meantime. The fact would appear that equity has sufficiently broad
powers, with or without legislation, to provide the relief suggested
above for legislation. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that
the courts for many years have shown little reluctance to use such
power. There is, it must be recognized, the possible argument that
in those states having legislation on this subject, such legislation,
inadequate though it is, supersedes the power of the equity court.
However, it is believed that the statutes in every instance were
passed merely to clarify the existing law or to provide a new remedy
or method of enforcing the right, not to limit it. Thus, under the
usual presumption that such a statute is cumulative rather than
exclusive of the previous remedies,108 equity still would have full
power to grant this remedy on the bill of any person having any
interest in the land. The right has long been recognized. The
remedy, it seems, is established. It awaits utilization.
107. SImS & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 105, at 237.
108. 3 SUTMERLAND, STATTORY CONS'RU ON § 5305 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
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